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C3fnchea
                           Argument
     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     CHEVRON CORPORATION,
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                   Plaintiff,
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                                          11 Civ. 691
               v.
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     STEVEN DONZIGER, et al.,
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                   Defendants.
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     ----x
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                                          March 15, 2012
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                                          10:10 a.m.
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     Before:
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                         HON. LEWIS A. KAPLAN
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                                          District Judge
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                            APPEARANCES
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24
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25
         LARRY R. VESELKA
                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.
                            (212) 805-0300
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C3fnchea Argument 1 (In open court) 2 (Case called) 3 THE COURT: Good morning. 4 I am allowing 15 minutes for each side. The defense 5 can divide it anyway they want. Mr. Mastro. MR. MASTRO: Thank you, your Honor. 6 MR. SMYSER: Your Honor. 7 8 THE COURT: Who are you, sir? 9 MR. SMYSER: I'm Craig Smyser. I am appearing on 10 behalf of Hugo Cammacho and Javier Piaguaje. I understood this 11 was an order to show cause directed to us. I understood we 12 would be expected to address the order to show cause initially, 13 you would want to hear from us first. 14 THE COURT: This is not your motion. 15 MR. SMYSER: No, but I understood the Court had 16 directed us to appear here to show cause why the temporary 17 restraining order should not be granted. 18 THE COURT: The movant speaks first. I don't know 19 what you do in Texas, but the movant speaks first in New York. 20 MR. MASTRO: Thank you, your Honor. Thank you for 21 seeing us this morning so quickly. 22 Your Honor, I am going to go right to the heart of the 23 matter for today because your Honor is very familiar with 24 attachment law and has written some of the seminal decisions in 25 this area like Capital Ventures by designation on the Second

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Circuit and Davila. A discrete issue here today is whether under CPLR 6210, this Court should grant a truly temporary, temporary restraining order "prohibiting the transfer, or attempted transfer of the defendants' assets until this Court has a chance to determine the attachment application."

Your Honor, the point of this is to prevent these defendants from frustrating the enforcement of a judgment that we might eventually obtain. They are principally foreign domiciliaries.

THE COURT: It is more narrow than that, isn't it?

It's to prevent them during the pendency of the motion for an order of attachment --

MR. MASTRO: Correct.

THE COURT: $\ \ \ --$ from frustrating the order of attachment that may or may not issue.

MR. MASTRO: Correct, your Honor. That is why -THE COURT: And even if it issues, which may or may
not be levied on attachable property.

MR. MASTRO: Correct, your Honor.

And I don't ask you to take my word for the fact that we are in such a situation. Once again, it comes out of the RICO defendants' own mouths, their representatives, and even their counsel in opposing this application.

Your Honor, the starting point for this is March 1, the Ecuadorian appellate court, at the LAPs' request, ignoring SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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directives from a BIT tribunal to the Republic of Ecuador, including its judiciary, to take all measures to prevent enforcement, declares nevertheless that the LAPs' judgment is enforceable.

What happens immediately after that? March 2, this is Exhibit 1272, Pablo Fajardo, their lead counsel in Ecuador publicly quoted as saying, the judgment is "enforceable" and that the LAPs will now seek to seize "the company's ships transiting the Panama Canal as well as its assets in Venezuela."

The very next day, March 3, Juan Pablo Saenz, another of the LAPs counsel in Ecuador, and a coconspirator in this case, Fajardo being a RICO defendant who defaulted, he publicly is quoted as saying, "We can immediately go to enforcement." "We have several teams all over the world who are ready to seize tankers, shares and production" and he talks of assignment and says the LAPs anticipate "a continuous flow of money into a trust." A trust that he says they have just "signed up yesterday" in which to assign judgment proceeds.

Your Honor, it doesn't stop there. Steve Donziger, the field general, RICO defendant, March 12. This is Exhibit 2080 -- at 1280, Saenz 1 was 1282. Steve Donziger himself told Reuters just in the past few days, March 12, that the LAPs intend to start seizing Chevron's assets around the world. He used the phrase "within weeks."

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First of all, the status report they provided your Honor on March 7, they told the Court that "On March 1, 2012, the Ecuadorian appellate court declared the Lago Agrio judgment is final and enforceable," their words.

Then on March 8, Mr. Keker and Mr. Smyser wrote this court seeking delay of these proceedings. Mr. Keker claimed "no current emergency."

Mr. Smyser said, Anticipating enforcement actions the LAPs may bring, he said they will take months if not years to complete. But neither offered to forebear during this interim period from assigning, alienating, transferring, dissipating the one asset that they have that could possibly cover a likely judgment in this RICO case, the \$18 billion Lago Agrio judgment.

March 11, their joint opposition to the TRO, they showed their hand. They listed all the exceptions they wanted to a TRO. They wanted, and these are on pages 2 and 3 and then page 18, their points 4 through 8. They claimed they needed to be able to make "transfers of interest" in the judgment "to provide critical litigation funding."

And they acknowledged the imminence of enforcement actions, but claimed they will again "take months to come to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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fruition," but ignored pointing out what they have said repeatedly before, not only in March Saenz and Fajardo about seizing assets, that their plan is "prejudgment attachments in those proceedings, proceeding ex parte, seizing assets and seizing boats.

THE COURT: Let me just ask you a question. A few minutes ago you referred to a statement by Mr. Saenz referring to a flow of money into the trust.

MR. MASTRO: Yes.

THE COURT: What is the record support for that? MR. MASTRO: Your Honor, it is Exhibit 1285.

THE COURT: Thank you. Sorry to interrupt.

MR. MASTRO: No problem. He repeated it in another press account, which I believe is one of our exhibits, where he told this to multiple reporters but it is on 1285.

 $\,$ THE COURT: Do you have the page reference or not? When it's convenient.

 $\,$ MR. MASTRO: Certainly, your Honor. My colleague will get it for you.

THE COURT: OK. Go ahead.

MR. MASTRO: Your Honor, everything that they asked as exemptions cried out for, they are planning to do exactly that which they shouldn't be doing during this interim period. They want to assign.

They want to be able to use that judgment to continue SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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to make the kinds of assignments they have done to Burford and De Leon and others. That is exactly what they shouldn't do during this period. This is what they said. They said that the TRO should be narrowed to "permit them the assignment of contingent interests in the Ecuadorian judgment during this interim period." They want to be able to assign contingent interest in the Ecuadorian judgment. That is page 18, No. 4, of their request.

THE COURT: Even if I were to grant the order of attachment, and even if the order of attachment succeeded in reaching any obligation of Chevron to pay the judgment, they would remain free, would they not, to assign interest in the judgment subordinate to the order of attachment. Isn't that correct.

MR. MASTRO: Your Honor, that is absolutely correct. It would be like the equivalent of a second mortgage. They could assign second positions. But the principal position, the primary position would be covered by the attachment.

Your Honor, they do the same thing in their request for narrowing No. 6, about wanting to be able to contract off of that judgment for purposes of litigation.

They did the same thing in request No. 7, that they want assurances that litigation funders will have the "first priority" if there are such arrangements.

And, finally, in No. 8, similarly, they want SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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assurances that any contractual rights by any persons that have anything to do with this judgment, that they will be effective.

Your Honor, you need to look no further for the need for this TRO than what they have said publicly, the RICO defendants since March 1, what their own counsel have said to this Court they are up to and intend to do.

Your Honor, I think I have said enough about their admissions publicly that not only make a TRO warranted, but necessary here. I point out, your Honor, the one thing they didn't say in their papers, the one thing they didn't say, and I'm sure your Honor will ask them, as your Honor has in the past, aren't you willing to forebear, do nothing to disturb the asset during this period?

Aren't you willing to assure the Court and the parties that the status quo would be maintained, and there wouldn't be any attempt to use the assets, to dissipate the asset, to assign the asset, to transfer the asset, to seek, to collect money on the asset to try seizures and prejudgment attachments on the asset until your Honor has a chance to decide.

They say nothing about it. In fact, they say the opposite. They say they want to be able to do all of that during this interim period. That ends the inquiry.

Your Honor, I will simply say this, the more things change the more they stay the same.

We made an attachment application on full notice, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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fully briefed. There is no lack of opportunity for them to have had their due process. They haven't put forward in this entire case one shred of evidence, one party declaration on personal knowledge, one iota of contradiction of our proof in support of our RICO fraud, unjust enrichment and other claims; not one shred, no one shred contradicting the Cabrera fraud, ghost writing; not one shred of proof contradicting the judgment ghost writing fraud and our other RICO fraud and unjust enrichment claims.

And they haven't put in a shred of evidence to contradict the compelling evidence in the four affidavits we have now put in confirming our damages for purposes of this attachment application.

The only thing they hang their hat on now, your Honor, is the fig leaf, the fig leaf that there has been entry of a judgment in Ecuador. It has been affirmed. The Ecuadorian courts tell us now it's enforceable, that should be the end of the story, you shouldn't even consider the fraud evidence. You shouldn't even be considering this attachment.

That is not the end of story, your Honor.

THE COURT: If you want to save some time for your rebuttal, you want to wrap it up.

MR. MASTRO: Certainly, your Honor.

I want to say before Mr. Smyser gets up here in fact the Ecuadoran courts refused to reach the fraud question. In SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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fact, even after the plaintiffs, having won, sought clarification to try to get that court to say something on the issue, that court on appeal said that the court "stays out of these accusations, preserving the parties' rights to continue the course of the actions that they have filed in the United States." That is docket entry 417.2.

So this issue is squarely before the Court. Attachment is warranted, but so critically for today's purposes, a TRO is absolutely necessary to preserve this asset until the court has a chance to decide the attachment issue.

The Saenz quote that I gave to your Honor, it is Exhibit 1285, page 6. "We have to play with the timing to allow the existence of a direct flow of money into the trust. We signed the trust yesterday so the legal mechanism already exists."

That is the exact quote. Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Smyser.

MR. SMYSER: Your Honor, I am here to take care of Javier Piaguaje and Hugo Cammacho two of the 30,000 inhabitants of the Oriente region affected by the years of environmental waste left behind.

Your Honor, Chevron filed this request for a temporary restraining order to attach my client's assets claiming, just SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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as Mr. Mastro has right here, that they are responsible for sham litigation. That my clients are engaged in fraud, and have received unjust enrichment from Chevron.

These claims are not just bogus, not just without merit, they are contemptuous and borne of a deep injustice by an outlaw company.

THE COURT: Mr. Smyser, there is no jury here. I have heard this interminably for over a year, and it would serve you better to address the legal issue before me.

MR. SMYSER: Thank you, your Honor. I appreciate the opportunity also to respond to the repeated claims that my clients are engaged in fraud and that they are engaged in sham litigation and have been unjustly enriched.

I would suggest only that if Chevron and its minions spent a week in the shoes of my clients, living the lives they've lived, they would understand how bogus the claim is that they have been unjustly enriched by anything Chevron has done.

Your Honor, let me address the legal failings in Chevrons request for a TRO. As an initial matter, the Court lacks jurisdiction over my clients. My clients do not have sufficient contacts with this forum to satisfy the limits the law places on jurisdiction over nonresident aliens.

We have consistently maintained that these legal limits do not permit action here against them. We continue to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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insist on that position.

Secondly, Chevron has not and cannot, nor has it today, demonstrated imminent harm. No enforcement or recognition action has been initiated anywhere on earth. If and when such proceedings are initiated I'm quite sure --

THE COURT: Suppose that you tomorrow assigned the entire judgment to a Kazakhstan company that was purely located in Kazakhstan?

Where do they go if they get a judgment in this case?
MR. SMYSER: Your Honor, there are two questions in
your question. First, are my clients capable of assigning the
judgment? As Mr. Mastro just pointed out, the trial court's
judgment requires that the money Chevron pays be deposited in a
trust. That trust is to be used to remediate that --

THE COURT: Mr. Smyser, if you were right about that, that is to say, that your clients are incapable of assigning anything, then why are you here? Why do you care?

 $\,$ MR. SMYSER: Your Honor, I care that both Chevron and the Court not go into error on this point. That is what I care about.

THE COURT: I had another case yesterday where conceivably I could have committed an error. I didn't see you here yesterday.

MR. SMYSER: Your Honor, my clients are in your court at the Court's direction and are responding to the allegations SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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that Chevron has made and the injunction the Court is considering.

THE COURT: You are telling me, sir, that your clients are legally incapable of assigning this judgment. Now, of course the judgment isn't the only property that an order of attachment could reach.

It is not even clear it could reach that at this juncture. But you are focused on the judgment and you are telling me your clients don't have the legal capacity to assign it, and therefore you've come up from Texas to say, Judge, please don't order my clients not to assign that which they couldn't assign anyway. I don't understand that. Possibly you could help me understand it.

 $\,$ MR. SMYSER: Your Honor, my point is if the Court reads the judgment, the judgment provides that the money damages are paid to a trust.

That's my point. That's what the trial court judgment said. And the Court has an agreed-on translation here in which that is what the Court says.

Now I'm not an expert in Ecuadorian law, but I understand the Court can read the judgment, Chevron can read the judgment.

Let me, your Honor, if I might, continue with why I believe this injunction should not be granted.

Chevron cannot and has not demonstrated imminent harm. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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 When Chevron persuaded the Court to enter its injunction first more than a year ago, Chevron cited the sky was falling, harm was imminent.

 $\,$ Mr. Mastro stood up and said the sword of Damocles is on our head. It is touching our forehead. And a year later it must still be there.

He said we were entering a world where gas stations would be without fuel. None of this has happened.

Moreover, Chevron in the last year announced profits of \$79 billion, fourth quarter alone of \$19 billion, both of which exceed the entire amount of the judgment. Chevron cannot demonstrate imminent irreparable harm.

THE COURT: The question on irreparable harm is not how much money Chevron is worth. It is whether your clients will be in a position to satisfy a judgment against them here, should that come to pass, if they have assigned any of their property, including whatever interest they might have in the judgment in Ecuador.

That is the question, isn't it?

MR. SMYSER: Well, your Honor, that might be the question on the attachment. The question here on the TRO, there is a disjunct between what they are seeking in the TRO and what the attachment is about.

THE COURT: No.

The question is, the TRO is simply whether I should SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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direct your clients to transfer none of their property long enough for me to deal with the motion for an order of attachment. And New York law specifically contemplates exactly such a TRO.

MR. SMYSER: Assume for the moment, your Honor, that my clients have the ability to transfer the judgment. The attachment which Chevron seeks, the ultimate relief that underlies this TRO is that they be garnished themselves. It wouldn't matter, right, that Chevron be garnished. It wouldn't matter if my clients had assigned all of their interest in the judgment. If the Court enters the motion for attachment garnishing Chevron, Chevron doesn't pay a dime.

There is no harm to Chevron. Chevron has failed to show a likelihood of success on the only basis for attachment against my clients.

Count six or unjust enrichment. My clients have received nothing from Chevron. A prerequisite of unjust enrichment is that Chevron itself must have enriched my clients. That has not happened. As we pointed out in our papers, this Court has more than 15 opinions in which it has written that in order to state a claim for unjust enrichment under New York law, plaintiff, Chevron, must show enrichment at plaintiff's expense.

To date my clients have received nothing but contempt and the back of Chevron's hand, both of which they will SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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willingly return.

There is no quasi in rem or in rem jurisdiction to justify attachment. There is no assets here for my clients in New York.

One of the purposes of the attachment TRO is to prevent them from taking assets outside of New York. Since they have no assets here, there is nothing here to be transferred. There is no in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction to justify attachment.

Eighth, and crucially, your Honor, to be entitled to a temporary restraining order, which is a form of equitable relief, Chevron must come to court with clean hands. Chevron's hands are as dirty as they come.

Let me just give you two instances. Chevron improperly manipulated the judicial inspection process. Recent discovery in another matter forced Chevron to disclose the secret judicial playbook. In the judicial playbook Chevron set out how its operatives were going to manipulate the judicial site inspections. First, before the site inspections occurred, Chevron operatives took samples at the site to determine where a sample was free from pollution, where that could be found. Then, when the inspector arrived, Chevron would direct the inspection to the predetermined clean site.

Next, Chevron maintained two sampling labs, one for public and judicial consumption, to which it would send SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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predetermined clean samples, and a second lab to which it would send dirty or questionable samples.

Finally, Chevron engaged two operatives in a nefarious scheme to attempt to entrap one of the judges in Ecuador in a bribery. When caught in the act, Chevron first maintained the operatives worked on their own, but it has subsequently been forced to admit that it has paid one of the operatives and his wife more than \$2 million in witness accommodation payments, including \$1 million in legal fees.

Finally, your Honor, in the paper filed last night by Chevron there are two points. One, Chevron has not pled vicarious liability for RICO conduct.

They allege in the paper they filed last night that my clients are vicariously responsible for the RICO conduct. Absent that pleading, there is no pleading to support that, the TRO on that count must be denied. The only reference to vicarious liability in Chevron's amended complaint is a footnote suggesting vicarious liability for tortious conduct.

Under well-settled Second Circuit law, RICO is a statutory cause, statutory civil action claim. A RICO claim is not a tort. Vicarious liability will not lie for violations of a RICO statute.

It is also a perversion of RICO to say that my clients, Ecuadorians, one of whom is an inhabitant of a tribe called the Secoya and the other a campesino were engaged in a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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1 racketeering scheme.
2 THE COURT: Did

THE COURT: Did you intend to leave any time for Mr. Werdegar?

MR. SMYSER: I will leave the time for Mr. Werdegar.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Werdegar.

MR. WERDEGAR: Good morning, your Honor. I know time is brief. I just want to make a few follow-up points with respect to my client Mr. Donziger.

TROs are one of the most drastic tools that your Honor has available and are supposed to be used with very great caution. And in this case, the TRO that Chevron has asked for, which the Court is contemplating in this hearing, is one that would have the effect of preventing Mr. Donziger on its face from paying for his own litigation in this case and from seeking funding to continue the litigation in Ecuador. Transferring any of his assets on the face of the order would be prohibited, and that could be read as preventing him from maintaining his family life.

 $\begin{tabular}{ll} There is no immediate and actual harm that would justify this kind of an order, your Honor. \\ \end{tabular}$

And to cite one of Chevron's own exhibits, Exhibit 1255, they have put a lot of weight on hearsay statements by Ecuadorian counsel. One statement that they haven't mentioned SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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to your Honor is in 1255 where Pablo Fajardo is quoted as saying "the execution of the judgment is not immediate," and that the payment of compensation could be made within five years through foreign lawsuits. That is in their Exhibit 1255.

So what is pending, what is threatening at most is the commencement of enforcement actions that will then take their time through the course of whatever foreign court it is brought in, but could be months, years, nothing that is going to happen in the next few weeks before this court has a chance to consider the full merits of Chevron's attachment motion.

THE COURT: The point of the issue is assignments of interest in the judgment.

MR. WERDEGAR: Your Honor, I think that's right. The only imminent irreparable harm that Chevron has focused on in its papers and in its motion is the fact that enforcement proceedings are about to commence Ecuador; and there is a disconnect between what they are seeking and the showing of imminent and irreparable harm that they have made.

They have not established any imminent harm of the judgment being assigned. And as Mr. Smyser pointed out, under what they are seeking and under CPLR 6210, the remedy of a TRO is available as to the garnishee, which in this case, according to Chevron, is itself. So the TRO would have to be to prevent Chevron from transferring the assets that are subject to the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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attachment order.

Now, your Honor, with respect to, quickly, the likelihood of success on the merits. We have a fully briefed pending motion to dismiss before this court that lays out why none of the claims that Chevron has asserted against Mr. Donziger are adequately pled. And because they are not adequately pled there can't possibly be a likelihood of success on the merits.

With respect to RICO in particular, because that is a focus of their motion, Chevron at this time lacks standing to bring that claim on two grounds.

First, it has not established and cannot establish that Mr. Donziger has proximately caused any of the harm that it is alleging. At this point in time, two courts in Ecuador have upheld the Ecuadorian judgment despite Chevron's best efforts to present all the same claims they are presenting here. Those courts constitute an intervening independent actor that precludes a finding of proximate cause we believe.

And then secondly, Chevron's harm remains speculative and uncertain. It hasn't paid a penny on the judgment, no enforcement actions have been done, and until the harm, if there is harm, from the judgment, that's found to be true, until that harm is known, its claim is unripe, and it lacks standing under RICO law.

Thank you, your Honor.

C3fnchea Argument THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 1 2 Mr. Mastro. 3 MR. MASTRO: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: I would like you to address the point 4 5 about 6210 and the availability of a TRO to prevent transfer of 6 assets by a garnishee. 7 MR. MASTRO: Yes. 8 Your Honor, it goes to the heart of what 6210 9 provides, that it is about preventing the transfer during this 10 interim period. 11 THE COURT: I understand that. But you are asking for 12 a TRO against these Ecuadorians and against the Donziger 13 defendants. 14 How are they garnishees? 15 MR. MASTRO: Your Honor, ultimately under the judgment 16 Chevron is a party that has the obligations under the judgment 17 and would be a garnishee. What they are doing, what they have been doing --18 19 THE COURT: You are saying Chevron would be the 20 garnishee with respect to the order of attachment? 21 MR. MASTRO: Correct, your Honor. Correct. 22 But, your Honor, what they are doing is they are 23 taking that asset, a judgment that purports to impose an 24 obligation to Chevron to make a payment to them, and they are 25 assigning it, assigning it to parties overseas.

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They are doing exactly that which you shouldn't be doing. They are taking their principal asset, which is this judgment or claim, and they are saying we want to -- they have assigned it. They want to be able to assign it.

They're doing worse than that, your Honor. What they're doing is not simply saying we have assigned, and we want to continue to assign, and the record is replete with their assignments already, Docket 354, Docket 1122, Docket 1107. There are different assignment agreements already for portions of their potential judgment and their judgment.

What they are also saying now, your Honor, is we want to be able to assign it, maybe assign it in its entirety. They have even created a trust for that, where those issues then may well be decided elsewhere, decided overseas. And they have also said we want to be able to seek enforcement. And they say to you, it will take months, if not longer.

THE COURT: But that has nothing to do with it, does it. Because what you are trying to do is to, for the next week, two, three, four, whatever it takes, to restrain them from transferring interest in the judgment pending an order of attachment. And even if I granted that and for that matter even if you attached the judgment, nothing there would stop them from trying to enforce the judgment. Right?

MR. MASTRO: But, your Honor -THE COURT: Isn't that right?
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MR. MASTRO: Your Honor --

1 MR. MASTRO: Your Honor --2 THE COURT: Please answer me.

MR. MASTRO: Your Honor, that is correct. Although it may be a contempt of whatever order your Honor issues or whatever attachment your Honor might ultimately impose.

THE COURT: How?

MR. MASTRO: For the following reason, your Honor.

Let me just explain why pursuing an enforcement proceeding and seeking, as they have repeatedly said they would, seizures of company tankers and assets as prejudgment attachments in those proceedings, even on an ex parte basis, is in essence taking the judgment and using it to have already seized overseas Chevron assets, a kind of compulsion or what they claim are Chevron assets, even though they are those of Chevron affiliates, and preventing those from being within the jurisdiction of whatever attachment order your Honor issues, because those assets will then have been seized overseas.

They will have dissipated or in one sense reduced the size of the judgment, which is their asset that they are seeking to enforce. So there is the potential for them, even during this interim period, if they proceed with ex parte attachment and seizures of vessels, to in essence reduce, dissipate, or alienate large parts of assets that are otherwise within the judgment that your Honor will determine.

THE COURT: So your position would be that the order SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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of attachment, were I to grant it and so forth, would prevent them from obtaining prejudgment remedies elsewhere?

MR. MASTRO: Your Honor, yes, for following reason. It's because the judgment, which is the asset that your Honor would be issuing the order of attachment regarding, if they were then able in this interim period to use that judgment to actually seize Chevron assets and force in essence a kind of payment during this interim period, because they would have seized it overseas --

THE COURT: Presumably it would bring it within the jurisdiction of some foreign court --

MR. MASTRO: Correct.

THE COURT: -- and the resolution by a foreign court of the rights and the property. And among the things presumably Chevron would be free to do would be to argue that, by virtue of the order of attachment, you have regardless, of the Ecuadorian judgment, a prior interest in the assets, right?

MR. MASTRO: Your Honor, that's certainly an argument we will make. But I think one of the very purposes of the attachment under these circumstances is that they not be in a position to do that. The attachment, which your Honor, we hope, will issue, will in essence be an attachment that doesn't obligation us during this interim period to have to pay on that judgment. But they would have tied-up assets overseas, and be forcing us to litigate about assets that are in fact subject to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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the attachment. That's why a TRO is particularly appropriate under these circumstances.

It is also the case that the property itself in an attachment situation, as your Honor well knows, is constructively in the possession of the U.S. marshal. What they seek to do in the interim period, if they were to try to go ex parte and get seizures, is to take part of that and have it tied up overseas for litigation overseas. Also, what they try --

THE COURT: I think it's time for you to wrap it up $\mbox{\rm Mr.}$ Mastro.

MR. MASTRO: OK. Also, your Honor, if they assign the judgment in this interim period, what they are trying to do is put that particular asset in the hands of others, and therefore make it potentially a situation that would pervert the ability of this Court to decide the attachment, to have that asset put into constructive trust.

So, your Honor, we very much believe that a TRO is absolutely necessary to prevent them from doing exactly what they say they are going to do, which is assign and attempt to seize in this interim period.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right.

I am taking it under advisement.

MR. MASTRO: Thank you, your Honor.
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1		MR. VESELKA: Your Honor, may we can ask one question.					
2		THE COURT: Who are you first?					
3		MR. VESELKA: I'm Larry Veselka. I am mr. Smyser's					
4	partner.						
5		THE COURT: Be seated please.					
6		MR. VESELKA: I think, as the Court knows, you have a					
7	response	to the attachment due Tuesday and on Monday is our					
8	response	to the motion for summary judgment in this case. We					
9	have requ	ve requested with the Court a short two-week adjournment of					
10	the respo	esponse to the summary judgment so we can focus on issues					
11	with rega	regard to the attachment. The motion for summary judgment					
12	has some	245 paragraphs to the 56.1 statement.					
13		THE COURT: I read your letter.					
14		MR. VESELKA: Right. We were going to ask if the					
15	Court was	rt was ready to rule on that.					
16		THE COURT: You will get a ruling when I'm ready to					
17	rule.						
18		MR. VESELKA: Thank you, your Honor.					
19		(Adjourned)					
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